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As defined by Geneva Call, an armed non-state actor is “any armed actor operating outside state control that 
uses force to achieve its political/quasi-political 
objective. Such actors include armed groups, 
rebel groups, liberation movements and de facto 
governments.”1 Many of the wars and conflicts 
being fought in the post-Cold-War environ-
ment involve actors outside of state control, 
and a rise in globalization has made financial 
and technical resources more available to these 
entities. Because the majority of conflicts today 
are fought with at least one party that does not 
acknowledge the legitimacy of the recognized 
government, complications arise with interna-
tional humanitarian law on how to effectively 
engage and monitor these groups, as they are 
not bound by international treaties.
NSAs and Landmines
Due to their widespread availability and 
cheap cost, anti-personnel mines were the 
weapon of choice for many NSAs throughout 
the latter part of the last century. However, 
due to stockpile destruction and the provisions 
against the production and trade of AP mines 
included in the Ottawa Convention, the avail-
ability of factory-made landmines has been 
drastically reduced over the past decade. Nev-
ertheless, from 2003–2005, at least 60 NSAs 
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used AP mines, including victim-activated im-
provised explosive devices.2 The use of victim-
activated IEDs, which are considered AP mines 
and prohibited by the Convention, account for 
most NSA mine use in recent years. (While 
NSAs frequently use command-detonated 
IEDs as well, these IEDs are not considered AP 
mines under the criteria of the Convention.) 
Only a handful of non-state actors, notably the 
Taliban in Afghanistan and the Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka, emplaced 
new factory-made or self-produced AP mines 
during the past two years.3,4 
anti-personnel mine. 
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1
JOURNAL: Non-state Actors and Mine Action: Complications and Solutions
Published by JMU Scholarly Commons, 2010
14.2 | summer 2010 | the journal of ERW and mine action | feature         51
While landmine use has been de-
creasing overall, the use of AP mines 
by NSAs still occurs more frequently 
than by government forces. During 
2008 and 2009, for instance, NSAs 
used AP mines in at least seven 
countries, three of which are States 
Parties to the Ottawa Convention. 
By contrast, the government forc-
es of only two nations did so during 
the same period.4 When states de-
ploy landmines, they generally do so 
to defend an area or disrupt an en-
emy. On the other hand, NSAs usu-
ally deploy them indiscriminately. 
They are also more likely than states 
to lay landmines near civilian-dense 
areas, such as schools or well-traveled 
roads, to cause as much disruption 
and terror among the population as 
possible. NSAs often lay landmines 
without conventional patterns, and 
maps or indicators that specify 
landmine locations following the 
conclusion of combat generally do 
not exist. 
The purpose for mine use var-
ies among these armed groups: fac-
tors including whether or not the 
group controls an area or terrain 
and the group’s access to various 
mine types affect how NSAs use 
landmines. One constant, howev-
er, is that the mines used are usu-
ally cheap and easy to operate and 
modify (allowing them to be used 
as victim-activated IEDs). Over the 
past decade, due to the moratoria 
on mine transfers imposed by the 
Ottawa Convention and other ex-
port bans, the global trade of AP 
mines has consisted mostly of low- 
level, illicit trafficking. As a result, 
AP mines have become less acces-
sible to NSAs by traditional means, 
such as purchasing them from 
neighboring states. In some cases, 
NSAs will acquire landmines from 
the state in which they are fighting, 
whether through looting weapons 
caches or by removing landmines 
already laid by the state.2 The black 
market is another source where 
NSAs can obtain landmines, as 
these mines are not under effective 
state control. A large black market 
began in Iraq following the start of 
the Iraq War (2003–present), with 
landmines belonging to the for-
mer Iraqi state now being sold and 
transferred throughout the country 
to insurgents.2
radio-controlled improvised explosive device. 
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a looted iraqi army installation, containing 155mm rocket-assisted and 155mm 
boat-tail high-explosive artillery shells. iraqi army ammunition Depot, shaykh 
na im, Kumayt, Maysan governorate, south eastern iraq. 
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In most conflict zones today, however, NSAs are 
less likely to emplace factory-manufactured AP mines 
than they are to deploy victim-activated or command- 
detonated IEDs. IEDs are common among NSAs be-
cause the materials used to make the devices are 
readily available. For instance, NSAs can modify AP 
mines and other conventional ordnance to construct 
these devices. Due to the unpredictable nature of these 
weapons, and the way they can be easily disguised as 
commonly found items—such as piles of rocks or even 
as bags of candy—IED use can be harder to control. Be-
cause non-state armed groups use landmines and IEDs 
in unconventional ways that frequently target or endan-
ger civilian populations, the necessity for monitoring 
and preventing their use is that much more pressing.
 
Engaging NSAs through Geneva Call
Because they are not recognized as states, NSAs can-
not become signatories to international legal instru-
ments such as the Ottawa Convention, even if they 
choose to adhere to the ban’s principles and initiatives. 
In order to bring NSAs to the mine-ban table, Geneva 
Call established the Deed of Commitment for Adherence 
to a Total Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines and for Coopera-
tion in Mine Action, which encourages NSAs to follow the 
guidelines put forth in the Ottawa Convention. The Deed 
of Commitment also enables NSAs to declare adherence 
to a set of humanitarian principles and in turn project 
themselves in a more positive light within the interna-
tional community for not using AP mines. Furthermore, 
including NSAs in disarmament discourse also encour-
ages them to pursue legitimate avenues for reaching their 
political goals, rather than organized violence. By pro-
moting dialogue and transparency, Geneva Call ulti-
mately hopes to persuade these groups to adhere to the 
same basic humanitarian standards expected of states. 
Since 2001, 41 NSAs from Burma/Myanmar, Burundi, 
India, Iran, Iraq, the Philippines, Somalia, Sudan, Turkey 
and Western Sahara have signed the Deed of Commit-
ment.5 Signatory actors commit themselves to 10 pillars 
of mine action, including banning AP mine use, cooper-
ating and taking part in stockpile destruction, allowing 
the monitoring and verification of their commitment by 
Geneva Call, and treating the commitment as a step to-
ward international humanitarian law.
Last year four new members signed the Deed of Com-
mitment, and 40 signatories met in June 2009 at Geneva 
Call’s Second Meeting of Signatories to the Deed of Com-
mitment, where participants discussed landmine issues 
as well as other topics such as protection of women and 
children in armed conflict. Geneva Call continues to 
reach out to nonsignatories in the hopes of persuading 
them to join the Deed of Commitment and plans to con-
tinue following up with signatories to guarantee their 
commitment to ban AP mine use.
In April 2010, two new actors—the Kurdistan Dem-
ocratic Party–Iran and the Free Life Party of Kurd-
istan/Liberation Forces of Eastern Kurdistan—added 
their signatures to the Deed of Commitment. As a re-
sult, all Iranian and Kurdish armed NSAs have banned 
AP mine use. 
However, one downside to negotiating with NSAs 
is that it potentially lends legitimacy to insurgent and 
terrorist organizations that they do not necessari-
ly warrant. In effect, these groups may capitalize on 
that credibility and transform it into popular support 
and new recruitment. When international organiza-
tions recognize and engage with NSAs, the latter may 
enjoy a new bargaining position that they may in turn 
use to advance their international standing. NSAs can 
Geneva Call is a Swiss-based NGO es-
tablished in March 2000 that works with 
and engages NSAs to respect interna-
tional humanitarian law. Since internation-
al humanitarian law focuses on states, and 
consequently, NSAs cannot become mem-
bers to international treaties, Geneva Call 
was established to create dialogues and 
encourage NSAs to change their behavior 
and respect certain humanitarian norms, 
including a ban on all AP mines. While 
Geneva Call focuses on the landmine is-
sue, it also engages NSAs on subjects 
such as small arms and light weapons, 
child soldiers, and gender.
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then use that momentum to their 
advantage by recruiting new mem-
bers or securing new resources from 
interested sponsors. Furthermore, 
just because NSA’s have abandoned 
the use of AP mines does not guar-
antee that they will not continue 
campaigns of violence against gov-
ernment and civilian targets using 
other tactics and different variet-
ies of lethal force. In fact, they may 
substitute their former weapons of 
choice with innovative, more effec-
tive alternatives.
Conclusion
The complications surrounding 
NSAs and including them in a mine 
ban, mine clearance initiatives or 
disarmament campaigns illustrate 
the need to continue engaging NSAs 
in dialogue. Over the past decade 
Geneva Call has shown the possibil-
ity to successfully include NSAs in 
such activities, although much work 
remains. Many NSAs still do not ad-
here to international humanitarian 
law and continue to indiscriminate-
ly place landmines and deploy IEDs, 
illustrating that their continued use 
remains a major obstacle in mine ac-
tion and weapons mitigation. 
See Endnotes, Page 81
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